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COMMENTS
THE RIGHTS OF INSURED TO REINSTATE-
MENT UNDER LIFE, HEALTH AND
ACCIDENT INSURANCE POLICIES
The field of insurance law provides our courts with one of the most
fertile fields of litigation today. As insurance contracts have developed
and spread out to cover nearly all phases of our personal, as well as
our business lives, more and more disagreements between the insured
and his insurer have naturally arisen. The broader and more complex is
the policy, the greater are the chances for disagreement, conflicting
interpretations, and subsequent litigation.
One of the most common disagreements arises as to the rights of an
insured to have his insurance policy reinstated, after he has allowed
it to lapse for non-payment of premiums.
It is a well-known principle of insurance law that a contract of
insurance should be construed liberally in favor of the insured or his
beneficiary, and strictly against the insurer, since the insurer was the
party who chose the language of the policy. If any part of the contract
is so drawn that there is ambiguity or uncertainty which requires inter-
pretation, a construction which favors the insured or his beneficiary
will be adopted, if it is consistent with the objects of the policy.' Of
course, where the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, the
above principle does not come into operation.2 The application for
reinstatement, being on a form prepared by the insurer, must likewise be
construed liberally in favor of the insured.3
Ordinarily, after forfeiture or lapse of a life insurance policy for
non-payment of premiums, whether or not an insured is entitled to
reinstatement of the policy must be governed by the terms of the
policy and the application for reinstatement. In the absence of a
compliance with a provision for reinstatement in the original contract
of insurance, and in the absence of a waiver or estoppel on the part of
the insurer as to the default, the only way to revive or to continue an
insurance policy is by an entirely new contract.4 To this end, there
must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, valid consideration, ap-
1. Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 385 P.2d 608, (Utah 1963); Dens-
more v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 652, (D.C. Pa. 1963).
2. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cline, 371 S.W.2d 158, (Tenn. App. 1963).
3. Bankers' Life Co. v. Hollister, 33 F.2d 72, (9th Cir. 1929).
4. Kirby v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 239 Mo. App. 476, 191 S.W.2d 379, (1945).
5. 3 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcricE, § 1971.
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plication and acceptance, and full knowledge of the circumstances
under which the application is made and the money paid.5 Under this
rule, the parties have the right to fix the terms of such reinstatement.6
On the other hand, an entirely different situation arises where the
insured has complied with the policy terms and provisions. The Illinois
case of People ex rel Tolley v. Illinois Bankers Life Assur. Co. of
Monmouth exemplifies most of the more recent decisions, in holding
that if the contract does not make reinstatement optional with the
company, a compliance with the conditions imposed by the terms of
the contract and of the rules and by-laws of the company gives the
insured the absolute right to reinstatement. It has also been held that
an insured's right to reinstatement upon compliance with the policy
provisions is considered to be a substantial property right,8 and a con-
tractual provision which the insurer has no power to change?
A few cases have, however, enforced policy provisions which made
such reinstatement entirely optional with the insurer.1 However, what
appears at first glance to be an obvious conflict of authority is found
to be, upon closer scrutiny, concerned with a situation distinguishable
in an equally obvious manner. In all cases holding that reinstatement
of a lapsed insurance policy is not effective until insurer has received
and passed upon the application, or may be made at the option or within
the discretion of the insurer, a close examination will reveal that such
a stipulation is contained in the provisions of the policy itself, and not
merely in the application for reinstatement. Thus, the insured, when he
entered into the contract, was bound to know its contents; and the
insurer has not violated the general rule against changing the contract
provisions. The necessary implication of the case law in this field,
therefore, is that the contract provisions are the controlling factors,
so long as they are not in contravention of public policy or state statute.
However, there is a small minority whose holdings are absolutely
irreconciliable with the general rule of the insured's absolute right to
reinstatement. It has been held that the insured, having made a written
application for reinstatement, could not thereafter be heard to say
that he did not consent to the terms of the application.' Nor could
6. Foley v. New York World Life Ins. Co, 185 Wash. 89, 52 P.2d 1264, (1936).
7. 283 I1. App. 6 (1935).
8. Rocky Mount Savings and Trust Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 201 N.C. 552, 160 S.E.
831 (1931).
9. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 192 Ark. 54, 83 S.W.2d 542, (1935).
10. Interstate Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Reid, 56 Ga. App. 144, 192 SE. 245, (1937);
Capital City Ben. Soc. v. Travers, 4 F.2d 290, 55 App. D.C. 214 (1925).
11. Struhl v. Travelers Ins. Co, 7 N.Y.S.2d 881, (App. Div. 1938).
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he complain because the insurer's offer to issue a new policy after
termination of the old one following default was not the same as
an offer on which the original contract was based, since he may
either accept or reject such offer. 12 And a Missouri court has even
held that an application for reinstatement is the only right which the
insured or beneficiary possesses after lapse of a life policy for non-
payment of premiums.' 3
Where discretionary powers as to the sufficiency of compliance with
the requirements for reinstatement are given to the insurer, it has
generally been held that the insurer may not act arbitrarily in determin-
ing whether the insured has complied with the conditions imposed by
the contract. 14 Insurer is bound to consider such application on its
merits,'3 and to pass fairly upon such application. 6 The insurer may
not act capriciously nor on the basis of mere whim or fancy.17
The standard provision in insurance policies authorizes reinstatement
of a lapsed policy on furnishing of satisfactory evidence of insurability
and payment of arrears of premiums, together with interests thereon. In
addition, most policies provide that the insured must file an application
for reinstatement, such reinstatement being conditioned upon the in-
surer's approval of the application. In Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n. of
Monmouth, Ill. v. Palmer, 8 it was held that a clause of this nature did
not confer arbitrary or discretionary power on the insurer's officials
to refuse reinstatement where the insured has complied with the pro-
vision. A reasonable compliance is sufficient. 9
Georgia alone seems to hold that such a clause confers this discretion-
ary power on the insurer. In Interstate Life and Accident Co. v. Reid,20
it was held that where reinstatement was conditioned upon the insurer's
approval of the application for revival, the insurer had the option to
reinstate the policy or not, in its discretion, with or without good reason,
and had no legal obligation to reinstate upon payment of arrears and
evidence of insurability.
12. Greenberg v. Continental Cas. Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 506, 75 P.2d 644, (1938).
13. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Silverstein, 53 F.2d 986, (8th Cir. 1932).
14. Gressler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 108 Utah 182, 163 P.2d 324, (1945).
15. Lane v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 S.C. 333, 145 S.E. 196, (1928).
16. Haselden v. Standard Mut. Life Ass'n., 190 S.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 924, (1939).
17. Sunset Life Ins. Co. of America v. Crosby, 380 P.2d 9, (Idaho 1963).
18. 176 Okla. 514, 56 P.2d 370, (1936).
19. Supra, note 15.
20. 56 Ga. App. 144, 192 S.E. 245, (1937). See also, Exchange Trust Co. v. Capitol
Life Ins. Co. of Colorado, 40 F.2d 687, (10th Cir. 1930); Capital City Ben. Soc. v.
Travers, 4 F.2d 290, (D.C. 1925).
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Where the right of reinstatement is made subject to certain con-
ditions, it is the insurer's duty to pass upon the application with reason-
able promptness and diligence under the circumstances.21 This is true
in spite of the fact that no time for such approval has been set forth in
the contract-the courts implying a reasonable time.22 On the issue of
unreasonable delay by the insurer in approving an application for rein-
statement, it is proper to introduce evidence tending to show the pro-
priety of the insurer's actions.2s The doctrines of both waiver and
estoppel are used in this regard, the courts having held that the in-
surer's delay waives the forfeiture,24 or estops the insurer from denying
that the policy was revived.25 And the insurer has been held liable to
notify the insured within a reasonable time even if his application for
reinstatement is rejected.2
Again, Georgia seems to be the only jurisdiction holding that such
negligent delay will not render the insurer liable,2 although a few de-
cisions have reached apparently the same result. Those cases are dis-
tinguishable in that the insurer actually had an insufficient time in which
to pass upon the application for reinstatement, e.g., where the insurer
received the application for reinstatement only two days before the
insured's death.2
The insurer may avoid the effect of a reinstatement obtained by
fraud, or by false warranties or material false statements in the applica-
tion for reinstatement. Thus, false or fraudulent statements as to the
health of the insured, as to whether or not he had consulted a physician,
as to other applications for insurance and policies issued thereon, and as
to personal injury suffered may be grounds for avoidance. The insured
is bound by the false representations of a third party who acts in obtain-
ing the reinstatement,"° regardless of whether or not such third party
21. Froehler v. North American Life Ins. Co. of Chicago, 374 Ill. 17, (1940) 27 N.E.2d
833.
22. Supra, note 8.
23. Hogue v. Supreme Liberty Life Ins. Co., 59 Ohio App. 409, 18 N.E.2d 503 (1939).
24. Supra, note 8.
25. Rome Industrial Ins. Co. v. Eidson, 142 Ga. 253, 82 S.E. 641, (1914).
26. Life and Casualty Co. of Tennessee v. Street, 213 Ala. 588, 105 So. 672, (1925);
Kinney v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 N.Y.S.2d 128, (App. Div. 1952).
27. Supra, note 10.
28. Exchange Trust Co. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 49 F.2d 133, (10th Cir. 1931).
29. Pavia v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co. of Worchester, 179 Pa. 272, 116 A.2d 762,
(1955).
30. Mullin v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co, 28 A.2d 456, 150 Pa. Super. 323
(1942).
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acted with the authority of the insured. 31 However, it has been held
that the insured is not bound by the misstatements in an application
filed by a third person without his knowledge, where no application was
necessary at all. 2 The right of an insurer to avoid a reinstatement for
fraud or false statements is operative as against the beneficiary of the
policy,3a or an assignee of the policy who has knowledge of the facts
involved.3 4
If a statement is a warranty in the absence of a statutory or con-
tractual provision to the contrary, the question of knowledge, good
faith, or intent does not arise, and the falsity of the statement in any
material particular will avoid the revival. 3 Likewise, in the absence
of a statute to the contrary, the right to reinstatement may be con-
ditioned upon the truth of the statements in the application. 0 As a
general rule, a reinstatement obtained by willful misrepresentations as
to material matters may be avoided,3 7 but a false statement as to an
immaterial matter does not vitiate the reinstatement. 38  In some juris-
dictions, good faith of the insured will not preclude avoidance if the
reinstated policy is procured by false and material misrepresentations39
On the other hand, in other jurisdictions, good faith and substantial
truth may be all that is required, and a false statement in the applica-
tion will not vitiate the policy unless it is fraudulent or material, or
unless it is willfully false or made with the intent to deceive.4"
To facilitate this discussion, a look at the Virginia Statute is desirable.
By Code of Va. (1950), sec. 38.1-357, it is provided that ". . . the
falsity of any statement in the application for any policy covered by
this article may not bar the right to recovery thereunder unless such
false statement materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or
the hazard assumed by the insurer." And in Code of Va. (1950), sec.
38.1-393, dealing specifically with life insurance policies, it is further
provided that ". . . all statements made by the insured shall, in the
absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties, and
31. Fraser v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 114 Wis. 510, 90 N.W. 476, (1902).
32. Turner v. Redwood Mut. Life Ass'n. of Fresno, 13 Cal. App. 2d 573, 57 P.2d
222 (1936).
33. Baxter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 115 Pa. 287, 175 A.899, (1934).
34. Reingold v. New York Life Ins. Co., 85 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1936).
35. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Rehlaender, 68 Neb. 284, 94 N.W. 129, (1903).
36. Shurdut v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 320 Mass. 728, 71 N.E.2d 391, (1947).
37. Smith v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 66 Ga. App. 1, 16 S.E.2d 763, (1941).
38. Harris v. New York Life Ins. Co., 27 Del. 170, 33 A.2d 154, (1943).
39. Sommer v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 281 N.Y. 508, 24 N.E.2d 308, (1939).
40. Shaw v. Imperial Mut. Life and Benefit Ass'n., 4 Cal. App. 2d 534, (1935).
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that no such statement or statements shall be used in defense of a claim
under the policy unless contained in a written application and unless
a copy of such statement or statements be endorsed upon or attached to
the policy when issued."
Such statutes are common in most jurisdictions, and have been held
to be applicable to applications for reinstatement as well as to the
original application for insurance.
Generally speaking, the insured is allowed a great deal of latitude
in his statements to the insurer concerning his continued insurability.
It has been held that the falsity of a statement bearing on the health
of the insured will not avoid the policy where it appears that the state-
ment was qualified as being true to the best of the applicant's knowl-
edge and belief,41 or that the statements were not necessarily to be taken
as literally true.42 Ordinarily, a statement in the application as to the
health of the insured is not a warranty of absolute good health or free-
dom from any body ailment, but is construed as meaning only that
the state of health is essentially the same as when the policy was
issued;43 and the terms "sound" or "good" health have been construed
to mean that the insured is free from any disease or illness of which
he is conscious, that tends seriously or permanently to weaken or im-
pair his constitution. 44 There have, however, been decisions holding
to a stricter interpretation of the insured's statements.
The fact that the company's agent has participated in the prepara-
tion of an application for reinstatement does not relieve the insured
from responsibility for material false statements contained therein.4 5
The failure of the insured to read his application for reinstatement does
not preclude the operation of this rule,46 most courts holding that the
insured, by his conduct, had made the agent his own agent for that
purpose. 7 However, it has been held that, in the absence of fraud
on the part of the insured, the insurer cannot avoid the reinstatement
because of false answers to questions inserted in the application by its
agent, where the correct information had been given to him by the
insured.48
41. Stanyan v. Security Life Ins. Co., 91 Vt. 83, 99 A. 417, (1917).
42. National Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Vaughan, 32 So.2d 490, (La. 1963).
43. Interstate Life and Acc. Co. v. Frazier, 40 Ga. App. 811, 151 S.E. 529, (1930).
44. Greenwood v. Royal Neighbors of America, 118 Va. 329, 87 S.E. 581, (1916).
45. Supra, note 29.
46. Chambers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 235 Mo. App. 884, 138 S.W.2d 29, (1940).
47. Axelroad v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 267 N.Y. 437, 196 N.E. 388, (1935).
48. Security Ben. Ass'n v. Farmer, 193 Ark. 370, 99 S.W.2d 580, (1936).
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In some situations, an insurance company may be regarded as having
waived fraud or misstatements in securing a reinstatement, or as being
estopped to deny reinstatement by accepting premiums. In order for
this to arise, the general rule is that knowledge of the invalidating facts
is essential,49 and the acceptance of the premiums must be uncondi-
tional."°
Thus, by undue delay in acting on an application for reinstatement,5'
by failure to communicate to the insured the rejection of his applica-
tion for reinstatement,52 by sending notice of a subsequently accruing
premium,53 or by accepting and retaining an overdue premium,54 the
insurer may be estopped to deny that the policy has been reinstated.
On the other hand, no estoppel or waiver can be implied from a mere
delay for a reasonable time in acting on the application for reinstate-
ment,5 5 or from conditional acceptance of a part payment of the premi-
um due.56 And, by failing to insist on a strict compliance with a pro-
vision of the policy as to evidence of insurability, the insurer does not
preclude itself from requiring such compliance on a subsequent oc-
casion.5 7
Most states provide for these contingencies by statute. Sec. 38.1-349
of the Code of Va. (1950) provides, in part, that each insurance
policy issued for delivery to any person in this State shall contain the
following provision:
If any renewal premium be not paid within the time granted the in-
sured for payment, a subsequent acceptance of premium by the in-
surer or by any agent duly authorized by the insurer to accept such
premium, without requiring in connection therewith an application
for reinstatement, shall reinstate the policy; provided, however, that
if the insurer or such agent requires an application for reinstatement
and issues a conditional receipt for the premium tendered, the policy
will be reinstated upon approval of such application by the insurer or,
lacking such approval, upon the forty-fifth day following the date
of such conditional receipt unless the insurer has previously notified
the insured in writing of its disapproval of such application.
49. Kear v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 144 N.Y.S.2d 373, 208 Misc. 645 (1955).
50. Bogosian v. New York Life Ins. Co., 315 Mass. 375, 53 N.E.2d 217, (1944).
51. National Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. McGeehee, 234 Ala. 482, 191 So. 884, (1939).
52. Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 48 N.D. 644, 186 N.W. 271, (1921).
53. Denver Life Ins. Co. v. Crane, 19 Colo. App. 191, 73 P. 875, (1903).
54. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Pettid, 40 Ariz. 239, 11 P.2d 833, (1932).
55. Union Life Ins. Co. v. Bolin, 201 Ark. 555, 145 S.W.2d 734, (1940).
56. Lucero v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 385 P.2d 255, (Colo. 1963).
57. Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 201 Ark. 734, 147 S.W.2d 3, (1941).
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As is readily apparent, the insurer may be bound by the acts of its
agent with respect to waiver or estoppel as to conditions for reinstate-
ment. This is true in some jurisdictions, even where the policy con-
tains an express limitation on the power of agents in this respect."
Notwithstanding such limitations, the insurer may by its acts extend
the authority of its agents.59
Where a contract of insurance has been allowed to lapse, and has
been subsequently reinstated, the question logically arises as to whether
the new policy is itself a new contract, or a revival of the old one. There
is a conflict of authority on this point.
A few courts have held that a new contract of insurance is thereby
created, containing new warranties, new conditions, etc., just as if no
prior policy had existed. ° This is particularly true where reinstatement
is discretionary with the company.0 1
But this is definitely a minority holding. The overwhelming majority
of courts hold that the old contract is thereby reinstated and revived,
and the new policy is merely a continuation of the old coverage. The
decision in Lanier v. New York Life Ins. Co.62 is typical of the majority
rule, where it was stated:
But we think the better rule and the one that would come nearer
doing justice is to regard the contract for reinstatement, not as a new
contract of insurance, but as a waiver of the forfeiture, thus restoring
the policy and making it as effective as if no forfeiture had occurred,
but reserving the right of the company to avoid the effect of the re-
instatement by showing, if it can, that the reinstatement was induced
by unfair and fraudulent means.
As Appleman states,63 this is, of course, the only logical result.
Usually the same document evidences the new protection. The premi-
um rate remains the same, instead of increasing to the age at which
the insurance is reinstated, as would necessarily be the case were it
actually a new contract. Neither do the terms and conditions of the
policy change, so that a provision of the original policy for nonliability
58. Madsen v. Prudential Ins. Co, 185 S.V. 1168, (Mo. 1916); But see, Spiegel v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 188 N.Y.S.2d 486, 160 N.E.2d 40, (1959).
59. Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co., supra, note 52.
60. Siegel v. Continental Cas. Co., 27 Ill. App. 290, 169 N.E.2d 587, (1960).
61. MacDonald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 304 Pa. 213, 155 A. 491, (1931).
62. 88 F.2d 196, (5th Cir. 1937).
63. Supra, note 5.
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in the event of the insured's suicide within a specified period from the
date of issuance of the policy is not revived. 4
Under this rule, it has been stated that reinstatement wipes out the
default as though it had never occurred, therefore reinstating the
policy in full from the date of default.-5 But at this point it is easy to
go to extremes. It is plain to see that, under this interpretation, those
who suffer injury or loss during the period of default are going to
attempt to have their policies reinstated if such injury or loss is covered;
and those who have not suffered injury or loss will probably make no
special effort for reinstatement. Therefore, if the insurance company
is exposed to reinstatement by all of the bad risks, and does not secure
reinstatement of the good risks, it is facing a situation which can ma-
terially affect its loss ratios.
It must be recognized that some courts have allowed such reinstate-
ment to operate retroactively and to cover losses during the period of
default. However, the better rule, and the majority one, permits such
reinstatement to act only prospectively, and not retroactively.
6
In deciding upon this question, some courts have looked to the terms
of the policy to determine the effect of reinstatement.67 Other juris-
dictions, however, have covered this situation by statute. Sec. 38.1-149
of the Code of Va. (1950), in providing for required policy provisions,
states that, ". . . The reinstated policy shall cover only loss resulting
from such accidental injury as may be sustained after the date of re-
instatement and loss due to such sickness as may begin more than ten
days after such date."
A nice question arises where the insured applies for reinstatement,
and then dies before the application is received by the insurer, or in-
surer approves the application without knowledge of the insured's
death. It has been held that the approval or acceptance by the insurer
of an application given without knowledge of the fact that the insured
had died intermediate the signing of the application and such approval
is ineffective. 8 Where the policy provides that reinstatement shall not
take effect unless at the date thereof the insured is living, or that the
company's approval is essential to a reinstatement, there can be no re-
64. Life and Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. McCray, 187 Ark. 49, 58 S.W.2d 199,
(1933).
65. Supra, note 62.
66. Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Wash. Co. 100, (Pa. C. P. 1963).
67. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Moore, 104 Ga. App. 194, 121 S.E.2d 286, ('1962).
68. Manning v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 330 S.W. 2nd 921, (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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instatement if the insured dies before his application is received or ap-
proved 9
On the other hand, where the insured has complied with the required
conditions, his death before the application for reinstatement is approved
or accepted by the company,70 or before it is even received by the home
office,' 1 does not permit the company to avoid liability. Of course, the
insurer may reject the application after the death of the insured, if it
would have been justified in rejecting the application or requiring
further proof at the time it was executed. 72 This is in line with the
general rule previously stated, that any conditions, to be given effect,
must be imposed by the policy itself.
Where the insured has a right to reinstatement acquired by virtue
of the original contract or some other agreement, a court of equity
will generally relieve him from the effects of a forfeiture of a policy.
73
The insured is not obliged to bring an action to compel a reinstatement
to which he is entitled; instead, he may recover damages as for a breach
of contract.74 The general rules of evidence, pleading and proof, and
trial procedure apply to actions for reinstatement," or to recover
damages for wrongful forfeiture.76 The time within which the action
may be brought is generally covered by statute.
A contract of reinstatement has been held to be a contract of the
state where the policy was delivered, and subject to the law thereof.7T
However, it has also been held to be governed by the law of the
place where the necessary payments were made, 8 and by the place
of its own execution.7 9 Therefore, a statute of the forum, where the
suit is brought in another state, has no application. 0
In the last few years, there has been a marked trend toward more and
more State intervention into private insurance contracts between the
insurer and the insured. Such intervention is legally justified by the
69. Independent Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pantone, 80 Ga. App. 426, 56 S.E.2d 153,
(1949).
70. Gressler v. New York Life Ins. Co, 108 Utah 182, 163 P.2d 324, (1945).
71. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co. 56 Ind. App. 418, 105 N.E. 505, (1914).
72. Kennedy v. Occidental Life Ins. Co, 18 Cal. 2d 627, 117 P.2d 3, (1941).
73. Bradbury v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 31 A.775, (NJ. 1895).
74. Belser v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 77 F. Supp. 826, (4th Cir. 1948).
75. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Heilbronner, 116 F.2d 855, (8th Cit. 1941).
76. Supra, note 70.
77. Chambers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 235 Mo. App. 884, 138 S.W.2d 29, (1940).
78. Harris v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 A.2d 154, (Del. 1943).
79. Wastun v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.2d 422, (8th Cit. 1926).
80. Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co, 57 R.I. 325, (1937).
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right of a State to impose certain conditions in return for the privilege
of doing business within its boundaries, and has its origin in the desires
of every State government to jealously protect the rights of its in-
habitants through the use of the ever-present, ever-meaningful shield
of public policy. It would seem that the plight of the Yale Law
Jounnal8' in 1931, that "there is a great need for the courts to recognize
the position of guardianship occupied by the insurer in society, and
to endow the insurer with a responsibility for efficient action far greater
than is required of the corner grocer," has been met, in part, at least,
by State legislation on the subject.
N. Woodrow Pusey
81. 40 YALE LAW JOURNAL 127 (1930-31).
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